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Résumé : Cet article se veut une critique de la thèse défendue par [Cleland
1993], laquelle soutient que la thèse de Church doit être rejetée puisque les
limites du calcul dépendent de la structure physique du monde. Dans un pre-
mier temps, nous offrons un (très) bref aperçu de la thèse de Church puis
nous présentons l’argument de Cleland. Par la suite, nous proposons une
analyse critique de son argument, ce qui nous amènera à faire quelques dis-
tinctions conceptuelles par rapport aux notions qui concernent la calculabilité.
Finalement, nous montrons que les limites du calcul ne sont pas physiques mais
bien logiques. En résumé, notre argument est que les limites du calcul sont
déterminées en partie par le fait qu’une procédure effective doit pouvoir être
décrite de manière finie.
Abstract: Even though Church’s thesis is widely accepted among mathe-
maticians, it is nonetheless controversial. In this paper, we argue against the
position of [Cleland 1993], which defends that Church’s thesis must be rejected
because the limits of computation depend upon the physical structure of the
world. We first give a brief overview of Church’s thesis and then we present
Cleland’s argument. We then propose a critical analysis of Cleland’s argu-
ment, which will involve some conceptual distinctions regarding the notion of
computability, and finally we will show that the limits of computation are not
physical but logical. In short, we argue that computation is limited by the
fact that an effective procedure must be described in a finite way.
Philosophia Scientiæ, 16 (3), 2012, 69–85.
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1 Church’s thesis and Turing machines
Church’s thesis emerged in reaction to the work done by various mathemati-
cians in the 1930’s. In trying to develop a reliable method to solve math-
ematical problems, individuals such as Church, Gödel, Kleene and Turing,
which respectively proposed the lambda calculus, the Recursive functions, the
Formal systems and the Turing machines, proposed decidable methods to com-
pute functions [Immerman 2008, 1]. A function f ∶ X Ð→ Y is an abstract
relation between two sets X and Y (where X is the domain and Y the image
of f) which associates at most one member of Y to a member of X. Put
differently, a function f is a set of ordered pairs < xi, yj >, with xi ∈ X and
yj ∈ Y , and can be represented as such: f = {< xi, yj >∶ xi ∈ X ∧ yj ∈ Y }. A
function can be total, meaning that each member of f ’s domain will be paired
with a member of its image, or it can be partial, meaning that only members
of a proper subset of f ’s domain will be associated with a member of its image.
The notion of ‘computing’ a function is an intuitive one. A function f(x)
is said to be computable if there is an effective procedure that could provide
one the value of f(x) from the value of x. The basic idea that lies behind
the notion of an ‘effective procedure’ is that it must be a list of instructions
that enables one to compute f(x) step-by-step when starting from x in a finite
number of steps. This list of instructions must be non ambiguous and there
must be only one rule to apply at each step of the computation. A function
f(x) is thus said to be effectively computable if there is such a procedure that
could (in principle) enable one to obtain f(x)’s value for each argument x
member of f ’s domain [Boolos 2007, 23].
In order to give a formal representation of the notion of ‘effective com-
putability’, Alan Turing [Turing 1936] proposed an ideal machine which is
now known as a Turing machine. The idea was to obtain an effective proce-
dure that could enable one to compute some functions from N to N. A Turing
machine is composed of a finite number of states
{q1, . . . , qn}
and can do four operations, namely ‘go left’, ‘go right’, ‘write S0’ or ‘write S1’:
L,R,S0, S1.
It is possible to picture a Turing machine as being a small box with four wheels
that moves on a tape which is separated in a denumerable number of squares
[Boolos 2007, 25]. A Turing machine can be represented by its (finite) list of
instructions
q0S0S1q1, . . . , qnS1S1qn,
where each quadruple is read “if the machine is in state qi and reads Sj , then
do Sk and be in the state ql. Since a Turing machine is a finite list of non
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ambiguous instructions that enables one to compute step-by-step the value of
a function by applying one rule at each step, it follows that a Turing machine
is an effective procedure to compute some functions f ∶ NÐ→ N.
Even though a function can be viewed as an abstract relation between
two sets, the work done in the 1930’s was not meant to apply to all type
of functions but only to arithmetical functions, that is functions which pair
natural numbers. Every definition of computation that has been proposed
by the aforementioned mathematicians has been proved to be equivalent to
one another [Immerman 2008, 3]. While Church proved that the class of
lambda-computable functions is equivalent to the class of recursive functions,
Turing showed that there is an equivalence between Turing- and recursive-
computability, which proved the equivalence between the three definitions of
computation [Copeland 2002, 4]. Seeing that these definitions of computation
are equivalent, Church proposed that they are an adequate representation
of our intuitive notion of an effective computation. Thus, Church’s thesis,
also known as the ‘Church-Turing thesis’—since Turing proposed that every
function that is effectively computable is Turing-computable—, means that
a function is effectively computable if and only if it pertains to the class of
recursive functions. In other words, Church’s thesis means that a function is
effectively computable if and only if it is Turing-computable. 1
2 Cleland’s argument
Even though Church’s thesis is widely accepted by mathematicians—there is
no widely accepted counter example—, it is nonetheless controversial. Among
those who argue against it lies Carol E. Cleland. In her article of 1993 [Cleland
1993], she proposes an argument against Church’s thesis. The rationale behind
Cleland’s argument, which is actually the central point that we want to discuss
in this paper and has been maintained throughout her career [see Cleland 1995,
2001, 2002], is that computation’s limits are physical rather than logical:
. . . the limits to computation are not to be found in abstract
Turing machine theory; for the limits to computation are causal,
as opposed to logical. [Cleland 1993, 286]
Since its first formulation, Church’s thesis has been interpreted in three dif-
ferent ways [Cleland 1993, 285], namely:
1. a number theoretic function is effectively computable if and only if it is
Turing-computable;
1. Church’s thesis is intimately linked to the halting problem. Since it can be
proved that the halting function is not Turing-computable [Boolos 2007, 40], it follows
that if one is able to find an effective procedure that can compute the halting function,
then Church’s thesis is false.
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2. any function is effectively computable if and only if it is Turing-
computable;
3. any effective procedure, including mental or physical phenomena, can
be reduced to the effective procedure of a Turing machine.
In order to argue against these three interpretations of Church’s thesis,
Cleland’s strategy is to define a notion of effective procedure which is superior
to Turing machines. Indeed, she wants to show that there is a kind of effective
procedure—the mundane procedure—which could in principle enable one to
compute functions which are not Turing-computable. Her aim is not to show
that Church’s thesis is false but rather to show that since computation’s limits
are physical, there is a strong possibility that the set of Turing-computable
functions is a proper subset of the set of functions which are ‘effectively com-
putable’.
Since mundane procedures can be applied to physical processes, it follows
that they can produce empirical results, unlike Turing machines which can
only give theoretical or abstract results. Therefore, mundane procedures are
superior to Turing machine’s procedure since they can “generate a causal pro-
cess when followed [Cleland 1993, 286]”. While a mundane procedure does
not differ from the procedure of a Turing machine regarding its instructions—
since both consist of a list of instructions which must be done in a temporal
order [Cleland 1993, 288, 291]—the distinction between the two resides in the
effectiveness of a mundane procedure. Indeed, Cleland considers a mundane
procedure to be effective “if following it always results in a certain kind of out-
come" [Cleland 1993, 291]. However, the effectiveness of a Turing machine’s
procedure does not depend upon the outcome but only upon the formulation
of its instructions.Thus, a mundane procedure differs from a Turing machine’s
procedure since it will only be effective if it gives us, by means of causal pro-
cesses, a result in the physical world.
This notion of ‘effectiveness’ implies that an effective mundane procedure
must take into account the physical structure of the world in order to achieve
its goal, since the list of (mundane) instructions needs to order actions that
will make a causal chain and result in a certain causal process:
In general, the effectiveness of a mundane procedure for a given
end depends upon what kinds of causal processes would be gen-
erated, were the procedure to be followed. [Cleland 1993, 294]
From this conception follows that an effective mundane procedure is not ef-
fective for all possible scenarios. The effectiveness of a mundane procedure
depends upon the physical context: instructions that aim at making a fire
would not be effective under water! In short, effective mundane procedures
differ from Turing machine’s procedures since they require causality in order
to achieve their goal.
Cleland on Church’s Thesis and the Limits of Computation 73
With that being said, Cleland applies the notion of mundane procedure
to the three aforementioned interpretations of Church’s thesis. Since a Turing
machine’s procedure does not have any causal dimension, it follows that the
third interpretation is obviously wrong since a physical process cannot be ob-
tained by a Turing machine [Cleland 1993, 301]. 2 In short, Cleland’s reasoning
is that:
[. . . ] the actions performed by a physical system are different from
those performed by a Turing machine. Unlike physical actions,
Turing machine actions are purely formal and have no causal con-
sequences. As a consequence, no Turing machine can realize the
causal activity of a physical system. But some of the things that
are done by physical system require physical activity. [Cleland
1993, 303]
Thus, she rightly rejects the third interpretation of Church’s thesis since there
are things that can be done by effective mundane procedures, but cannot be
done by any Turing machine [Cleland 1993, 304].
After having rejected the third interpretation, Cleland turns to the second
and the first ones. In order to reject the second interpretation, which concerns
any type of function, she points out that a Turing machine cannot compute
the identity function i ∶ R Ð→ R [Cleland 1993, 306]. Obviously, a Turing
machine is not able to compute a function from R to R since there is no finite
representation of the real numbers. Considering that a real number can be
represented by a denumerable sequence of natural numbers, it follows that a
Turing machine would not even be able to read the argument of the function,
and thus would never be able to finish its first step.
However, and this is where the argument is seriously going astray, Cleland
argues that a mundane procedure would be able to do so. If we suppose a
‘possible world’ where space and time are continuous, then a particle that
moves in this continuum could be taken as a function which computes i(x)
since it would be pairing each point of the time with a point in the space
[Cleland 1993, 306]. In other words,
[. . . ] if we let the places and times concerned stand for the appro-
priate real numbers, then an object moving at unit speed can be
interpreted as computing i(x). [Cleland 1993, 307]
Therefore, insofar
[. . . ] as it is possible for an effective mundane procedure to ini-
tiate a genuinely continuous causal process, it is possible for an
2. Let us note that, to the best of our knowledge, no decent mathematician nor
any philosopher of the 1930’s has supported that all physical or mental phenomena
could be reproduced by a Turing machine—or any analytical funct
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effective mundane procedure to compute a function that could be
computed by no Turing machine. [Cleland 1993, 308]
Finally, taking into account that a physical process can do more than a Turing
machine, Cleland concludes that there
[. . . ] is no conceptual basis for even the modest supposition that
no effective mundane procedure could compute a so called uncom-
putable number-theoretic function. [Cleland 1993, 310]
To sum up, the rationale behind Cleland’s argument in order to reject
Church’s thesis is that the limits of computation are not logical but causal
[Cleland 1993, 309]. Since a mundane procedure is superior to a Turing ma-
chine’s procedure, it follows that there is not any good reason that could con-
vince one that a mundane procedure could not compute more than a Turing
machine. A mundane procedure is characterized by causality and this en-
ables it to mirror a more complex structure than a Turing machine could do.
Considering that it is possible to imagine a mundane procedure which could—
in principle—accomplish more than a Turing machine’s procedure, Cleland
concludes that we have a good reason to doubt Church’s thesis, and thus
“shift the burden of the proof” to its defenders.
3 Critical analysis
In short, Cleland’s strategy is to show the ‘possibility’ of Church’s thesis falsity.
In order to do so, she argues that the limits of computation are physical.
Since Turing machines cannot generate causal processes but causal processes
can simulate Turing machines, she concludes that it is perfectly rational to
assume that mundane machines are, in principle, able to compute more things
than Turing machines could. Rather than proving that Church’s thesis is
false, she “shifts the burden of the proof” to those in favor of it. But this
strategy is bogus: Church’s thesis is not provable! On the one hand, the
notion of ‘effective computation’ is an intuitive one and can be interpreted in
many different ways. Thus, it is not possible to prove that every thing which is
effectively computable is Turing-computable. However, it has been shown that
all notions of effective computability developed in the 1930’s are equivalent.
While it is not a proof of Church’s thesis, it is clearly an argument in its favor. 3
On the other hand, there are 2ℵ0 functions from N to N. How could we be able
to prove that each function f ⊂ N ×N which is computable—that is for which
there is an effective procedure—is Turing-computable? We only know what
an ‘effective procedure’ means if we accept Church’s thesis! The only thing
we can do with Church’s thesis is to prove its falsity and show that there is at
3. We will return on that point in section 3.4.
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least one function which is effectively computable but not Turing-computable.
Therefore, “shifting the burden of the proof” of Church’s thesis does not really
mean anything.
For the sake of the argument, let us assume that “shifting the burden of
the proof” is an acceptable strategy. The question that needs to be answered
is this one: does Cleland’s argument give us good reasons, that is rational rea-
sons, in order to doubt Church’s thesis? In our view, the answer is no. In order
to show that, our analysis will be aiming at two points. First, we will show
that Cleland’s reasoning is seriously flawed. Before criticizing her main argu-
ment regarding the computation of i(x) ∶ R Ð→ R within a physical structure
isomorphic to the formal structure of the real numbers, we will briefly criti-
cize her argument regarding the third interpretation of Church’s thesis, even
though this is not the central point of our critic. The core of our critic regards
the argument against the second interpretation of Church’s thesis, which is
used by Cleland in order to show the ‘possibility’ of the first interpretation’s
falsity. After showing that this argument relies upon a false premise, we will
show that her analysis relies upon an incomprehension of some notions. This
will lead us to make some conceptual clarifications regarding both notions of
‘computability’ and ‘effectiveness’. In the second part of the critic, we will
discuss the core of Cleland’s argument, namely the thesis such that the limits
of effective computation are physical rather than formal.
3.1 The third argument
Before analyzing the core of Cleland’s reasoning, we thought that it would be
appropriate to note some points regarding the argument she proposes against
the third interpretation of Church’s thesis. In order to show that the third in-
terpretation of Church’s thesis is false—that is any effective procedure, includ-
ing mental or physical phenomena, can be reduced to the effective procedure
of a Turing machine—, Cleland argues that since a physical phenomenon re-
quires causality, it follows that a Turing machine, which lacks causality, cannot
reproduce a physical phenomenon.
Insofar as the action-kinds specified by a Turing machine program
are purely formal, they have no causal consequences and, hence,
cannot, when performed, generate a causal process. The upshot is
that there are no Turing machines which are effective for making
Hollandaise sauce. [Cleland 1993, 301]
This is true enough: a Turing machine, which is an abstract machine—by op-
position to a real/concrete machine—, cannot act in the world. She makes this
point because she argues that it is widely accepted that Church’s thesis applies
to a class of functions wider than the class of number theoretic functions.
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The thesis is frequently taken by computer scientists to represent
an ultimate limit to all computation and, hence, has been con-
strued as applying to functions in general, as opposed to just the
number theoretic functions. [Cleland 1993, 284]
However, while the first part of that affirmation is true, the second is mislead-
ing. What is true is that there are many functions that can be reduced to
number theoretic functions. Let us take an extreme example: the brain. If we
assume that the basic mechanisms of the brain are discrete, then the brain’s
functioning can be viewed as inputs, outputs and discrete states, which can
be simulated by a Turing machine (trivial since it is finite).
Now, regarding the argument of causality, let us suppose that there is
a mundane machine that follows a mundane procedure in order to make
Hollandaise sauce. Suppose that there are compartments in which we can
put the ingredients and so on and so forth. We push a button and then there
is a finite sequence of operations which gives one Hollandaise sauce. Nobody
is arguing that this is a Turing machine: this is a food processor! However,
even if the mundane machine cannot be simulated by a Turing machine, its
processor can.
Thesis. A mundane machine is a Turing machine which is plugged into a food
processor.
It would be interesting to have a clear counterexample that contradicts
this thesis.
3.2 The computability of i(x)
Cleland’s main argument in order to show the possibility of Church’s thesis
falsity regards the computability of i(x) ∶ RÐ→ R. In order to show that some
mundane machines could in principle be able to compute more things than
Turing machine could, she tries to show that a mundane machine would, in
an adequate physical structure, be able to compute i(x).
Let us imagine a possible world in which space and time are both
genuinely continuous, i.e., a world in which any interval of space
and time, no matter how small, has an uncountably infinite num-
ber of places and times; it is worth noting that many people be-
lieve that the actual world is such a world. Let us further suppose
that motion is a continuous process, more specifically, a process of
occupying different places at different times in such a way that ev-
ery intervening place along the path of motion is (at least) passed
through; in other words, moving objects do not jump over (to
speak metaphorically) intervening places. Thus, a moving object
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can be thought of as pairing places with times. But the times
and places concerned are, by assumption, uncountably infinite in
number. As we have seen, no Turing machine could mirror such a
pairing. This certainly suggests the possibility that there are func-
tions which can be computed by physical systems which can’t be
computed by Turing machines. [Cleland 1993, 306]
The first thing to say is that this argument relies upon a false premise.
Indeed, in such a world, R would be well ordered by ‘≤’, which is mathemati-
cally false! The idea that an object would be able to pass through each point
of the continuum in the order—without “jumping over” any point—is absurd.
This is Zeno’s argument all over again! It would be impossible that an object
moving at unit speed in a continuum pass through [0,1] going from one point
to another respecting the order ≤. Even if one accepts the axiom of choice and
the existence of a well ordering of [0,1], such an order would have nothing
to do with ≤. On a continuous interval such as [0,1], every xi has neither
an immediate predecessor nor an immediate successor. The same applies if
we assume that time is also continuous: the object would not be able to pass
through every point of the continuum. Even if we accept that a continuous
interval of time is isomorphic with a continuous interval of linear space, this is
not an argument in favor of the existence of an enumeration of the space inter-
val’s points (nor of the time interval’s moments). There is no possible world
such as Cleland describes it. The history of mathematics shows us that the
notion of a ‘genuine continuum’ is illusory. All notions of continuum which are
consistent are those of Cauchy, Dedekind, Bolzano, Weierstrass, Borel, etc.,
which rely on computable approximations. For example, f(x) is continuous at
x0 means that ∀ǫ > 0, ∃δ > 0 such that ∣x−x0∣ < δ implies that ∣f(x)−f(x0)∣ < ǫ.
A genuine continuum is an illusion. Even if most (classical) physicists consider
that space, time, mass, etc., are continuous, every calculation they do in R is
an approximation, and thus is Turing-computable. Computing π’s value for
the nth decimal can be done by a Turing machine.
But even without this remark Cleland’s objection is flawed. Indeed, there
seems to be a confusion between the definition of a function and its computa-
tion. At first, she says that:
[. . . ] an actual computation of a function must mirror the de-
tailed formal structure of the function: Each and every element
in the function’s domain must become matched to the appropriate
element in its range. [Cleland 1993, 305]
Then, she continues and says that since
[. . . ] no Turing machine can [match to all of the values in the
domain their assigned values in the range], no Turing machine
is capable of precisely mirroring the detailed formal structure of
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a function from the reals onto the reals. As a consequence, no
Turing machine can, strictly speaking, compute even the identity
function i(x) which assigns to each real number x the value x
itself. [Cleland 1993, 306]
Finally, she concludes that a mundane machine could, unlike any Turing ma-
chine and in an appropriate physical structure, compute the function i(x).
What is required for the computation of such a function is a way
of achieving the requisite assignment of values to arguments, and
such a way would be provided by a process of motion such as that
described above. Indeed, if we let the places and times concerned
stand for the appropriate real numbers, then an object moving at
unit speed can be interpreted as computing i(x). [Cleland 1993,
306–307]
In these quotes, Cleland is confusing the computation of a function with its
definition. As we know, a function can be defined analytically (e.g., f(x) = 3x+
2) or by stating the set of its ordered pairs (e.g., f = {< 3,7 >,< 5,2 >,< 7,8 >}).
However, in general, pairing the numbers is not equivalent to computing them.
While it is possible to define a function by paring a number x with a number
y, the computation of a function is the procedure by which we obtain y from
x. Saying that f(7) = 49 for f(x) = x2 is not the computation of f . One can
know that f(7) = 49 without being able to compute it! The computation of a
function is done by an effective procedure, which is a description of the way of
pairing. When the function is partial and the set of ordered pairs is finite, an
effective procedure can be trivially constructed from the set of ordered pairs
(the definition of the function). However, while such a definition provides one
(trivially) with a mean to effectively compute a function in finite cases, it is
important to note the distinction between the definition of a function and
its computation. Even if an effective procedure can be constructed from a
finite set of ordered pairs, it makes no sense in an infinite case, in particular
for a function f ∶ N Ð→ N. A set of ordered pairs cannot be a definition
for a function which has a denumerable (or non denumerable) domain. The
description of a set of ordered pairs is finite. Thus, it would not provide one
with the means to compute the function for any member of its domain. It
would only be possible to obtain an effective procedure that would enable one
to compute the function over a finite subset of its domain, namely the subset
represented by the finite set of ordered pairs. In short, computing a function is
not equivalent to “matching each and every element in the function’s domain
to the appropriate element in its image”. This is neither a way to define nor to
compute a function in infinite cases. The distinction between the computation
of a function and its definition is a fundamental one. A physical process by
which it is possible to pair numbers is not a way to compute a function. In the
same manner that the graph of a function is not its computation—it is only a
way to represent it—, constructing a set of ordered pairs is not either.
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Moreover, she does not seem to grasp the meaning of the concept of ‘effec-
tively computable’. On the one hand, she makes a non necessary distinction
between the effectiveness of a Turing machine and the effectiveness of a mun-
dane machine. Basically, Cleland argues that the effectiveness of a mundane
procedure is characterized by its outcome. Indeed, she says that “the effective-
ness of a mundane procedure depends upon the kind of causal process that
would be generated” (section 2). But what Cleland is referring to is the effi-
ciency of the procedure rather than its effectiveness. A procedure is said to
be effective when it can be described in an non ambiguous way, meaning that
the list of instructions must be finite and that one must be able to know what
to do at each step of the computation. However, a procedure is efficient if it
gives one the desired result. With that being said, there is no reason to as-
sume that the effectiveness of a mundane procedure depends upon its potential
outcome. The effectiveness of a procedure depends upon the clarity and the
non ambiguity of its instructions. As a Turing machine, a mundane procedure
can be effective without being efficient. A Turing machine which computes
f(x) = x + 1 is effective and efficient for computing that function over a finite
subset of N, but it is not efficient for computing g(x) = 5x3. However, it is still
effective nonetheless. The same applies to mundane procedures: a mundane
procedure that makes Hollandaise sauce is effective and efficient for doing so.
However, while it is not efficient in order to make a fire, it will still be effective,
in the sense that its list of instructions will be well defined. The procedure of
a Turing machine does not differ from the procedure of a mundane machine:
in both cases, if we want a result, we will need to apply the procedure. While
the effectiveness of a procedure depends upon the clarity and the non ambi-
guity of its list of instructions, the efficiency of a procedure depends upon the
outcome.
On the other hand, she does not seem to understand the concept of ‘com-
putability’ that lies behind Church’s thesis. Indeed, Church’s thesis concerns
functions such that the members of f ’s domain and image are described in a
finite and non ambiguous way, meaning that the members can be distinguished
unequivocally. A function that answer this condition is computable if and only
if it can be described by a non ambiguous procedure—an algorithm—which
enables one to transform the description of a member of the domain into the
description of a member of the image within a finite number of steps. While
these two conditions may not be sufficient, it only matters that they are both
necessary conditions for computability. 4 The point is that Cleland herself ad-
mits that R does not satisfy the first condition. A function f ∶ R Ð→ R is not
computable since there is no finite representation of the real numbers. So the
question is: what does Cleland mean when she affirms that i(x) ∶ R Ð→ R
could be computed by a mundane procedure in an appropriate physical struc-
4. Each function f ∶ X Ð→ Y that satisfies these two conditions is Turing-
computable by gödelisation.
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ture? The answer to that question seems to be ‘nothing specific’. Cleland’s
conception of computation is naive and unrealistic: she argues that mundane
procedures could compute more functions than Turing machines because “com-
puting a function requires that each and every argument of the function be
matched to its assigned value [Cleland 1993, 307].” There are two things going
on here. First, as we said earlier, constructing a set of ordered pairs is a way
to define a function, not to compute it. Second, with such an understanding
of computability, neither i(x) nor any function f ⊂ N ×N could be computed!
Insofar as it is impossible to “match each and every argument of the function
to its assigned value” for functions in the natural or the real numbers, it is
impossible to compute these functions in Cleland’s sense. To match each and
every element of the domain to its assigned value would be an actual compu-
tation of the function. Thus, such an understanding of ‘computability’ is not
suitable for total functions. 5
3.3 The argument against Church’s thesis
The rationale of Cleland’s reasoning is that computation’s limits depend upon
the physical structure of the world. In order to argue against the ‘real’ Church’s
thesis, which corresponds to the first interpretation, 6 she uses the aforemen-
tioned example regarding i(x) to make her point. Yet, her argument is never
totally and explicitly mentioned. Anyhow, assuming that she is talking about
functions into N, the following quote is the less obscure formulation of her
argument:
Whether a particular function can be in fact computed depends,
however, upon the detailed causal structure of our world, i.e., upon
whether there exist causal processes having the requisite formal
structure. It is very likely that not all functions can be computed
in our world. It is also possible that some functions that cannot
be computed in our world can, nonetheless, be computed in other
causally possible worlds, i.e., worlds whose causal structure differs
in important ways from our world. Such functions could be said
to be in theory, but not in fact, computable. [Cleland 1993, 309]
The argument, if we understand her correctly, can be rephrased as following:
5. Let us also point out that since there can only be finite number of functions
that are actually computed, it would imply that there are (considerably) more Turing-
computable functions.
6. A function f ∶ NÐ→ N is effectively computable if and only if it pertains to the
class of recursive functions.
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P1 The limits of computation depend upon the physical structure
of the world.
P2 A function can be in fact computed if the world has the
appropriate physical structure.
P3 A function can be in theory computed if it is possible to
imagine a world that could mirror its formal structure.
∴ There are functions that are in theory computable but are
not Turing-computable.
Even with Cleland’s understanding of ‘computability’, it makes no sense to say
that a total function is in fact computable. Thus, the distinction between in
fact and in theory is unnecessary: to say that a function is computable means
that it has the potential of being actually computed over a finite interval
of the domain. The problem with this argument is that the only example
that Cleland proposes regards a function into the reals. But as we saw, the
notion of computability does not even apply to the real numbers, nor does
Cleland’s understanding of it. So, does this argument show the possibility of
Church’s thesis falsity? Notwithstanding the fact that since Church’s thesis
is not provable, it follows that it is per se possible that it is false, Cleland’s
argument does not give us a good reason to doubt it. We would like to have
a clear counterexample which contradicts Church’s thesis.
3.4 The limits of computation
Notwithstanding the aforementioned analysis of Cleland’s argument, it is im-
portant to bring forward an actual argument in favor of Church’s thesis.
Contra Cleland, the limits of computation are not to be found within the
physical structure of our world. The limits of computation are logical, which
makes Church’s thesis highly plausible. The limits of computation only de-
pends upon the procedure, and this can be shown even within Cleland’s own
argument.
The argument she proposes in order to doubt Church’s thesis’ plausibility
relies upon a distinction between in theory and in fact computability. An ex-
ample of a function which is in theory computable but not in fact computable
would be f(x) = 2x!. 7 For the sake of the argument, we will assume that the
distinction she makes is an adequate one. In short, she argues that it is pos-
sible to imagine a world in which there are some functions that are in theory
computable but not Turing-computable. But what does it mean for a function
to be in theory computable? It means that there can be an effective mundane
procedure which is not efficient in our world but could be efficient in another
7. Note that this function is however Turing-computable since it can be defined
recursively.
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world whose physical structure differs from ours. The question is: since a
function can be in theory computable without being in fact computable, is
it correct to assume that computability depends upon the physical structure
of our world? No, because a function can be computable without being in
fact computable. Therefore, Cleland’s conception of computability does not
depend upon the efficiency of the procedure but rather depends upon its ef-
fectiveness (thus the non necessary distinction between mundane procedures
and Turing machine procedures). In other words, the physical structure of the
world only matters for the in fact computability, and so the physical structure
of the world is not relevant for Cleland’s notion of in theory computability.
Cleland’s notion of ‘computability’ does not depend upon the physical struc-
ture of the world because it does not depend upon the efficiency of a procedure.
A function can be computable even if there is no result in the world. Thus,
even in the case of mundane procedures, the notion of ‘computability’ does
not depend upon causality but depends only upon the effectiveness of the
procedure. Computability, at the end, depends upon the effectiveness of the
procedure, and not its efficiency.
At this point, we tried to show that Cleland’s argument is flawed. Now, we
want to show that Church’s thesis is plausible and that computation’s limits
are logical. In short, our argument relies upon the following thesis:
Thesis. If a function is computable, then its computation process can be
described.
Note that the converse is not true. For example, the halting function can
be described but is not, according to Church’s thesis, computable. As we said
earlier, the two following criteria are necessary conditions to computability.
1. The members of f ’s domain and image can be described in a finite and
non ambiguous way, meaning that the members can be distinguished
unequivocally.
2. The function f can be described by a non ambiguous procedure—an
algorithm—which enables one to transform the description of a member
of the domain into the description of a member of the image within a
finite number of steps.
In other words, it makes no sense to say that a function is computable if it
cannot be described! If we accept this thesis, it follows that Church’s thesis is
highly plausible. Let us have a little thought experiment in order to illustrate
this point.
As we saw earlier, even in the case of mundane procedures, computabil-
ity relies upon the effectiveness of the procedure, meaning that a function
is mundane-computable if and only if there is a finite and non ambiguous
mundane procedure that could enable one to compute that function in some
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possible world. With such a definition of computability, it is easy to think
of an abstract mundane machine that is able to follow a mundane procedure.
This conception of an abstract mundane machine is perfectly consistent with
Cleland’s conception of ‘in theory computability’. As a Turing machine can
informally be represented by a little box on four wheels which prints or erases
‘strokes’ on a denumerable tape, let us imagine a mundane machine as being
a little human in an infinite space, an infinite time, with infinite resources and
which does not make any mistake. This machine has three states, it can:
q0 ∶ stop
q1 ∶ receive information
q2 ∶ act.
For the sake of the example, let us see the actions of the machine like phenom-
ena: the machine causes and perceives phenomena. Since each phenomenon
can be described, it follows that there is a denumerable number of phenom-
ena. Indeed, a description is a finite combination of words, which are finite
combinations of letters. So even if we accept a denumerable alphabet, there
will still be only a denumerable number of finite descriptions. 8 Thus, if we
accept that there can only be a denumerable number of phenomena that can
be described, it follows that our machine will be able to causes and perceives
only a denumerable number of phenomena:
S0, . . . , Si, . . .
No matter how many possible worlds there can be, we can assume that each
mundane machine can be described. Moreover, we do not have to take into
account the physical structure of these worlds because ‘in theory computabil-
ity’ only requires the effectiveness of the mundane procedure—and not its
efficiency. It is possible to represent a mundane machine by its list of instruc-
tions. Thus, let us represent a mundane machine by a list of quadruples
qiSjSnqm.
with 0 ≤ i;m ≤ 2 and j;n ∈ N. Since a mundane machine can be represented
by its list of instruction, it follows that there are as many mundane machines
as there are lists of instructions. If we accept that a non ambiguous list of
instruction is finite, it follows that there is a denumerable number of mundane
machines.
8. This is not controversial: it would not be possible to know every letter of a
non denumerable alphabet and it does not make sense to speak of a ‘denumerable’
description of a phenomenon.
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Proposition 1. There is a denumerable number of mundane machines with
three states.
Proof. There is a denumerable number of possible instructions. Indeed, there
is a denumerable number of quadruples since there is 3 possible qi and ℵ0
possible Sj , and so there is 3 ⋅ ℵ0 ⋅ ℵ0 ⋅3 = ℵ0 possible quadruples. Since the list
of instruction is finite, it follows that there are ℵ0
m lists of length m, and so
there are ℵ0
1
+ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ + ℵ0
m
+ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ = ℵ0 possible lists.
Proposition 2. There is a denumerable number of mundane machines with
ℵ0 states.
Proof. Even if we suppose that a mundane machine can have a denumerable
number of states, there will not be more mundane machines. There will be
ℵ0 ⋅ ℵ0 ⋅ ℵ0 ⋅ ℵ0 = ℵ0 possible quadruples. By the same reasoning, there will be
ℵ0
1
+ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ + ℵ0
m
+ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ = ℵ0 possible lists.
Therefore, if we accept that it must be possible to describe an effective pro-
cedure, it follows that there can only be a denumerable number of mundane
machines. Let fT and fM be respectively the class of Turing- and mundane-
computable functions. We know that both cardinality of fT and fM are ℵ0.
Cleland assumes that everything which is Turing-computable is mundane-
computable and that there are functions which are mundane-computable but
not Turing-computable, that is fT ⊂ fM . The interesting point is that even
though Cleland assumes that mundane machines can compute functions that
Turing machines cannot, mundane machines cannot compute more functions.
The cardinality of the set of functions from N to N is 2ℵ0 . The upshot is that
as soon as we accept the two aforementioned conditions for computability, it
follows that the cardinality of the set of computable functions is at most ℵ0.
4 Conclusion
So what are the limits of computation? The computability of a function de-
pends upon the possibility of describing in a finite and non ambiguous way
the algorithm by which we can go from x’s to f(x)’s value. The limits of
computation are to be found within the formal structure of mathematics, and
this ultimately depends upon the manner in which we describe it. Thus, com-
putation is limited by our understanding of mathematics and the way we can
describe them. These are two formal limits, and this is why Cleland’s thesis
must be rejected. The main point we tried to make within this paper was that
the limits of computation do not depend upon the physical structure of our
world: computation’s limits are logical. This can be illustrated by the fact
that in order for a procedure to be effective, it must be possible to describe
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it in a finite an non ambiguous way. So here lies the limit of computation:
the cardinality of the class of computable functions cannot be higher than ℵ0
because the finite description of an effective procedure is a necessary condition
for computability. Even though we cannot prove Church’s thesis, this gives us
a good reason in order to accept it.
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